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LIABILITY FOR TRANSFUSION-TRANSMITTED DISEASE
The importance of blood transfusions in medical treatment is well recognized.
The network of blood banks and volunteers that provide blood for use by hos-
pitals in transfusions is an integral part of the medicalfield. The recent AIDS
epidemic and the ability of the AIDS virus to be transmitted through blood
threatens the use of this life-saving procedure. This Note outlines the potential
liability of these organizations and suggests procedures to avoid liability.
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INTRODUCTION
AIDS1 is a disease which has generated significant controversy in
all social circles. The mention of the word causes fear and trepida-
tion among medical professionals and lay people alike. The public
has reacted from fear, resulting in ostracism of AIDS victims.2
1. AIDS, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, is "a disease, at least moder-
ately predictive of a defect in cell-mediated immunity, occurring in a person with no
known cause for diminished resistance to that disease." Centers For Disease Control,
Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 31 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 507-08 (1982) [hereinafter MMWR]. AIDS attacks and
weakens the body's immune system, leaving it highly susceptible to several parasitic
illnesses such as Pneumocystic carinii pneumonia and a rare cancer, Kaposi's Sar-
coma. Jaffe, Choi, Thomas, Haverkos, Auerbach, Guinan, Rogers, Spira, Darrow,
Kramer, Friedman, Monroe, Friedman-Kien, Laubenstein, Marmor, Safai, Dritz,
Crispi, Fannin, Orkwis, Kelter, Rushing, Thacker, Curran, National Case-Control Study
of Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystic Carinii Pneumonia in Homosexual Men: Part 1,
Epidemologic Results, 99 ANNALS INTER. MED. 145 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Cooperman, 209 N.J. Super. 174, 507 A.2d 253
(1986), modified 105 Nj. 587, 523 A.2d 655 (1987); District 27 Comm. School v.
1
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Homosexuals, who have struggled for equal rights and acceptance in
the mainstream of society, are arguing among themselves and their
battle for acceptance is waivering.3 Prosecutors and police agencies
are faced with the problem of how to prosecute AIDS victims and,
more importantly, how to incarcerate these persons. 4 Civil rights
proponents are debating whether AIDS carriers should be locked up,
away from the public, in a manner similar to lepers. 5 AIDS appre-
hension, a fear of contracting AIDS, has caused AIDS patients to feel
isolated and lonely. Society must become educated about high risk
behavior, such as multiple sex partners and IV drug use, so that
AIDS victims can be accepted until a cure is found.6
It is estimated that 500,000 to one million Americans are infected
with the AIDS virus.7 As more people become affected, the medical
community will be forced to develop more strict protective medical
techniques in order to protect the public and to limit liability. AIDS
is transmitted through blood.8 The ability of blood to save lives is
tempered by its ability to transmit diseases such as hepatitis and
AIDS.9 The ramifications of this risk severely affect the current sys-
tem of blood services.
The widespread impact of the disease has prompted medical pro-
fessionals to undertake extensive research in disease control, medical
techniques, and public awareness. The groups most significantly af-
fected by the AIDS panic are blood banks, hospitals, doctors, nurses,
surgical technicians, laboratory technicians and other professional
medical blood handlers. These people are forced to weigh the AIDS
patient's right to receive medical treatment against public policy,
personal safety and exposure to legal liability.
Board of Educ., 130 Misc.2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); Parmet,
AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 (1985).
3. Cowell, AIDS and Community Health Issues, 33 J. AMER. COL. HEALTH 253, 254
(1985).
4. See Robinson, AIDS and the Criminal Law: Traditional Approaches and a New Stat-
utory Proposal, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91 (1985).
5. See generally Parmet, supra note 2 (the renewed interest in quarantines must be
balanced against the constitutional rights of victims).
6. See Cowell, supra note 3, at 257-58.
7. J. SLAFF &J. BRUBAKER, THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 25 (1985).
8. Curran, Lawrence, Jaffe, Kaplan, Zyla, Chamberland, Weinstein, Lui,
Schonenberger, Spira, Alexander, Swinger, Ammann, Solomon, Auerbach, Mildvan,
Stoneburner, Jason, Haverkos, Evatt, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Associ-
ated With Transfusions, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 69, 70 (1984).
9. Transfusion associated diseases include hepatitis, cytomegalovirus, malaria,
syphilis and AIDS. See AMERICAN AsSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS TECHNICAL MANUAL
at 338-40 (9th ed. 1985) [hereinafter AABB TECHNICAL MANUAL]. Although the
transmission of AIDS through transfusion has not been conclusively proven, AIDS
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The public has turned to the legal system for guidance and protec-
tion, and this has caused the legal community to be faced with a diffi-
cult series of questions. The answers to these questions will help
determine the legal rights of AIDS victims and the scope of protec-
tion available to the public. The balancing of personal rights and
public safety is already beginning. The legal system must find a way
to provide protection for the public without enhancing the current
AIDS panic and without placing unreasonable expectations on the
medical community and blood services. Courts and legislatures are
already debating the constitutional issues and the liability issues sur-
rounding AIDS, the AIDS victim and the medical profession.10
This Note focuses on the legal determination of liability for trans-
mitting disease through blood transfusions. The two current legal
theories proposed for determining the scope of liability are negli-
gence and strict liability. Actions in negligence have already been
brought against medical professionals and facilities by patients who
contracted diseases through blood transfusions. 11 Actions for recov-
ery by infected patients based on strict liability have been limited in
most states by finding that blood transfusions are a service and not a
product.12 Future imposition of liability for transfusion-transmitted
AIDS will depend on how negligence is defined and whether immu-
nity from strict liability is challenged by the existence of AIDS. This
determination will affect all professionals and facilities in the chain of
blood services.
Part I of this Note examines liability based on theories of negli-
gence. The four groups most commonly attacked in negligence ac-
tions are blood banks, hospitals, physicians and blood donors.13
Each group is separate and distinct and has its own standard of care
and conduct that make it susceptible to liability. Each relies on the
other to meet its standard of care. The standard of care for the indi-
vidual plaintiff is defined by professional medical practices, federal
regulations, state regulation and common law.14 The most signifi-
cant of these standards are the accepted professional medical prac-
tices.1 5 Standards established by voluntary professional
organizations, such as the American Association of Blood Banks
(AABB) or the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals
(JCAH), will be admitted as evidence of customary and profession-
10. See generally Willett, Transfusion-Transmitted Diseases: Legal Aspects, LEGAL ISSUES
IN TRANSFUSION MEDICINE 55, 56 (AABB ed. 1986).
11. See generally Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24
STAN. L. REV. 439, 446-56 (1972).
12. For a discussion of this concept, see Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1967); see also infra notes 186-197 and accompanying text.
13. Franklin, supra note 11, at 446; Willett, supra note 10, at 56.
14. See generally Franklin, supra note 11, at 439; Willett, supra note 10, at 56-7.
15. See Willett, supra note 10, at 56.
19883
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ally accepted medical practices.16 The individual standard is the
standard to which the participating professional or medical facility
will be held.
Part II of this Note discusses the scope of liability under the theory
of strict liability. Strict liability gives a plaintiff the power to hold a
non-negligent defendant liable. The defendant need only be one in
the series of persons who gather the blood, process the blood and
administer the transfusion. This Note reviews the rationale for strict
liability and concludes that strict liability is inappropriate in deter-
mining liability for transfusion-transmitted diseases.
I. LIABILITY BASED ON THEORIES OF NEGLIGENCE
A. Definitions
Blood supply is from two sources: volunteer and paid donors.17
Whole blood is generally donated by volunteers, 18 while blood com-
ponents' 9 are generally obtained from paid donors.20 Collected
blood is stored in a blood bank.21 It works in a manner similar to a
bank. Donors make deposits of blood, and when needed, this blood
is withdrawn by the hospital for the donor in need of a transfusion.22
Most often, this blood is for a patient who is a depositor in the blood
bank. Patients needing blood for surgery can make an autologous
donation, a donation made by the individual who needs the blood.23
If an autologous donation is not available, the supply of blood "bor-
rowed" is replaced by other donors.24
While the American Red Cross represents the largest non-profit,
volunteer-based system of collection of blood,25 the AABB is a col-
lection service representing the transfusion interests of hospitals.2 6
The AABB seeks to meet the needs of area hospitals through collec-
tion, storage, inspection, testing and other technical services related
16. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326,
331, 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (where the stan-
dards for hospital accreditation, state licensing regulations and hospitals' own bylaws
indicated that medical authorities and the profession expected hospitals to assume
certain responsibilities for their patients).
17. Williams, Blood Transfusions and AIDS: A Legal Perspective, 32 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q 267, 269 (1986).
18. Id.
19. 21 C.F.R. § 606.3(e)-(g) (1987).
20. Williams, supra note 17, at 269.
21. TABOR'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY B-40 (12th ed. 1974).
22. Schmidt, The Blood Banking System: Organization, Economics and Regulatory
Framework, LEGAL ISSUES IN TRANSFUSION MEDICINE 5, 9 (AABB ed. 1986).
23. See Is the Blood Supply Safe? CONSUMER REP., Oct. 1987, at 597.
24. See Schmidt, supra note 22, at 9.
25. Id. at 10-11.
26. Id. at 11.
[Vol. 14
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to transfusion of blood.27
Some commentators argue that blood from paid donors is statisti-
cally less "safe" than blood from volunteer donors.28 Fear of receiv-
ing contaminated blood has led some patients to request "directed
donations" or blood from a particular person. 2 9 Directed donations,
however, may not be the safest course of protection for the patient.30
The only significant difference between the American Red Cross and
the AABB are the scope of service and blood access. 3' Because of
the similarity between these blood collection services, they will be
treated alike for purposes of this analysis.
B. Blood Bank Liability for Negligence
A blood bank's liability generally arises out of one of three situa-
tions. First, a blood bank may negligently select the donor.3 2 Sec-
ond, a blood bank may negligently process or test the blood.33
Finally, a blood bank may be found negligent in denying a patient's
request for a directed donation.34
1. Donor Selection
Careful donor selection is essential for the safety of the recipi-
ent.3 5 Donors are selected after a physical exam and documentation
of the individual's medical history. 3 6 This information is used to de-
termine potential dangers of transfusing the individual's blood. If
the blood technician is satisified that the information obtained is sat-
isfactory, blood is drawn from the selected donor. Before the blood
is processed for patient use, it is subjected to a series of tests which
identify the blood type, Rh factor and other typical blood character-
istics.37 The blood examination is also used to isolate and monitor
27. Id.
28. See Franklin, supra note 11, at 445; Williams, supra note 17, at 269-70.
29. Bove, Directed Donations, LEGAL ISSUES IN TRANSFUSION MEDICINE 69, 69
(AABB ed. 1986).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 90-126.
31. Id.
32. See infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
35. AABB TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra note 9, at 2.
36. Id. at 2-9.
37. The suitability of a donor is determined by a qualified physician. A donor
must be in good health as indicated by the limited physical exam and must be free
from any disease transmissible by blood transfusion, insofar as can be determined by
history and examinations, and must be free from skin punctures or scars indicative of
addiction to self-injected narcotics. Additionally, no individual will be used as a do-
nor if he has a history of viral hepatitis. A series of specific questions are to be asked
of every donor. To satisfy the Federal Drug Administration's requirement that a do-
nor be free from any disease transmissible by blood transfusion, insofar as can be
1988]
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various antibodies and diseases, such as venereal disease, hepatitis
and AIDS.38 Specific standards for donor selection and testing pro-
cedures are set by the AABB and the Food and Drug Admistration
(FDA).
Failure to follow professional standards established by the regula-
tors of the blood industry may result in liability.39 Liability has been
discussed in a number of blood transfusion cases. In Hoder v. Sayet,40
the defendant blood bank was unable to show it followed the appro-
priate professional standards in processing several units of blood.
The plaintiff contracted hepatitis from one of two units of blood
used in a transfusion.41 The donor of the first unit had given a ficti-
tious name and was therefore unavailable for further testing.42 The
second donor was found and questioned. He testified that the blood
bank had not asked him any of the screening questions required by
the regulatory organizations.43 The court reversed summary judg-
ment for the defendant, stating that a jury may reasonably infer that
there had been a similar failure to screen the missing donor. 44 The
fact that the blood bank was licensed and accredited was only a prima
facie indication of its adherence to certain minimum standards of
care in donor selection and blood processing.45 Although causation
determined by history and examinations, donors with any history of hepatitis or po-
tential AIDS will be rejected. People who are members of, or sexual partners of
people in a category considered at high risk of AIDS are asked to abstain from dona-
tion. Id.
38. Id. at 338-41.
39. Blood Supply 'Administrative Error' Admitted in Settlement of Suit on Transfusion,
AIDS POLICY AND LAW (Aug. 27, 1986). This article discusses Borchelt v. Irwin Me-
morial Blood Bank, No. 8193 (San Francisco Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 1985), the first case to
determine liability for transmission of AIDS through blood. The case settled midway
through trial when the defendant admitted that it allowed a donor infected with AIDS
to be used in a transfusion. The donor, a male homosexual, had not completely filled
out the blood bank's questionnaire that was used to screen donors. Id.
Other cases discussing the need to follow standards established by regulators of
the blood industry include Morse v. Riverside Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 422, 426, 339
N.E.2d 846, 850 (1974) (blood bank may be negligent for failing to perform certain
tests, provided that experts are able to testify that the failure to perform such tests
departs from the standard of reasonable care, or stems from the failure to question
potential donors whether they have experienced a series of diseases, particularly hep-
atitis). Cf Klaus v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n Blood Bank, Inc., 62 Cal.
App. 3d 417, 419, 133 Cal. Rptr. 92, 93 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1976) (choice of donors
could be made in a way to mitigate the possibility of infection, and failure to use a
reasonable means of doing so can furnish the basis for a negligence claim).
40. 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
41. Id. at 209. The blood bank apparently received the blood from two donors.
42. Id.
43. Id. The court noted that the blood bank was required to ask the potential
donor about his or her health, well-being and other matters.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 209-10 ("[i]f the hospital or its agents had reason to know that these
[Vol. 14
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could not be shown, the plaintiff was allowed to present the case to
the jury because of the defendant's inability to show a consistent pat-
tern of following the designated standards.
Evidence of specific procedures used in following the professional
standards shielded the defendant from liability in Tufaro v. Methodist
Hospital, Inc.4 6 In Tufaro, the plaintiff contracted malaria following a
transfusion.47 The plaintiff produced two donors who testified that
they were not asked any questions by a female interviewer regarding
malaria exposure. 48 The donor's credibility diminished, however,
when the donor history card showed the interviewer had been
male.49 The donor history card and the system of donor selection
set forth in the blood bank's procedure manual was the only evi-
dence submitted by the defendant. The defendant's expert testified
that in all likelihood, all the questions on the donor card had been
asked.50 It was the defendant's routine procedure of following the
guidelines that ultimately protected the defendant from liability.51
It appears that licensing and accreditation create the presumption
of adherence to standards established by the industry and regulatory
agencies. A plaintiff may rebut this presumption, however, by show-
ing a deviation from the procedures. The defendant then has the
burden of showing that the standards were indeed followed. In
Tufaro, the defendant documented its adherence to standards. It was
able to effectively challenge the plaintiff's rebuttal and avoid liabilty.
The defendant in Hoder was unable to produce evidence showing a
consistent pattern of performance and was unable to sustain the
plaintiff's rebuttal. Therefore, documentation of procedures and the
systematic adherence to safety standards will play an important part
in determining liability.
A blood bank must not only follow the appropriate standards, it
must be able to produce documented evidence that the procedures
are strictly followed. This may be accomplished through establishing
a clear and concise policy and procedure manual and by continuous
training of all staff. Interviewers should be properly trained and su-
pervised to assure quality control.52 Documentation of the proce-
dures, training and supervision received is essential.53 Establishing a
minimum standards were not being followed, it cannot be allowed to escape
liability...").
46. 368 So. 2d 1219 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
47. Id. at 1219.
48. Id. at 1220-21.
49. Id. at 1220.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1221. The defendants utilized the only technique available in the coun-
try in 1972.
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procedure is not enough; in order to avoid liability, the blood banks
must be able to provide clear and convincing evidence that they are
following the procedures.
2. Testing of Donor Blood
Donor blood tests, which are recognized as necessary by experts in
transfusion medicine, may be a basis for blood bank liability for fail-
ure to perform the test. 54 Experts sometimes disagree, however, on
which tests should be performed.55 Also, adequate testing tech-
niques may not be available.56 When available testing is inadequate,
experimental, or not feasible, a blood bank should not be held liable,
as long as all available and appropriate testing was completed.57
When tests are available, questions arise as to the scope and selec-
tion of test procedures. Accredited standards are developed by pro-
fessionals and represent a professional concensus. The standards
are designed to answer questions regarding the scope of testing.
They take into consideration the individual opinions of participating
professionals. Performance of test procedures required by regula-
tion and accredited, professional standards should absolve a blood
bank from liability for negligence.58 This is true even if individual
physicians have differing opinions as to which test or procedure
should be followed.59
The absolution of professionals who follow the appropriate testing
guidelines originated during litigation which questioned the ade-
quacy of screening hepatitis-carrying donors.60 This principle and
the resulting rules are equally applicable in cases involving AIDS-
carrying donors.
There was no adequate, cost-effective, or consistent method to test
for AIDS before 1985.61 Commercial test kits for AIDS became
54. See, e.g., Morse v. Riverside Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 422, 426, 339 N.E.2d
846, 850 (1974) (liability for failure to test may be based on a departure from a stan-
dard of reasonable care in the community).
55. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Blood Servs. of Mont., 161 Mont. 359, 365, 506 P.2d
449, 452 (1973) (defendant not liable where the plaintiff claimed that the blood bank
was negligent in failing to perform a donor blood test which was not required by any
accrediting agency).
56. See, e.g., Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 765, 527 P.2d 1075, 1076
(1974), cert. denied, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974) (where, at the time of the transfusion in
question, no test could adequately detect the presence of the hepatitis virus).
57. Id. at 766, 527 P.2d at 1077 (blood bank is neither strictly liable nor negli-
gent where testing is unavailable).
58. See Hutchins, at 365, 506 P.2d at 452.
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 54-59.
61. Kuritsky, Rastogi, Faich, Schorr, Menitove, Reilly, Bove, Results of .ationWide
Screening of Blood and Plasma for Antibodies to Human T-Cell Lymphotropic III Virus, Type III,
26 TRANSFUSION 205 (1986) [hereinafter Kuritsky].
[Vol. 14
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available in the spring of 1985.62 Most blood banks began routine
AIDS screening of donors when these kits were introduced. 63 Under
the availability and feasibility rule, a blood bank should not be found
negligent for failing to screen a donor for AIDS prior to March
1985.64
Some states have passed legislation mandating the use of an AIDS
screening test.65 Unfortunately, the AIDS screening tests are not
foolproof. A problem still exists regarding the sensitivity and speci-
ficity of the available tests. 66 In 1986, an evaluation of six commer-
cial test kits was performed by European researchers. 6 7 Of the six
test kits evaluated, two kits correctly detected the antibody to HTLV-
III in all 163 sample specimens. 6 8 The other four kits obtained false-
negative results in one to three of the 163 samples.69 The report
concluded that all six tests were suitable for screening blood do-
nors. 70 Accordingly, a blood bank should not be found negligent for
choosing to use any of the six testing devices, because all six testing
devices were approved by the industry's professionals.71
This exemption for negligence assumes that by satisfying the pro-
fessional testing standard, the "reasonable prudence standard," used
to determine the standard of care and duty of the professional
charged with negligence, has also been satisfied.72 This may not be
true. In Helling v. Carey,73 the court extended the reasonable person
62. The Food and Drug Administration licensed the first test for HTLV-III/LAV
antibodies in blood in March 1985 to Abbott Laboratories. 50 FED. REG. 9909
(1985). See also Reesink, Huisman, Gonsalves, Winkel, Hekker, Lelie, Schaasberg,
Aaij, van DerDoes, Desmyter, Evaluation of Six Enzyme Immunoassays for Antibody Against
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 2 LANCET 483 (1986) [hereinafter Reesink].
63. Kuritsky, supra note 61, at 206.
64. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Although this rule would absolve a
blood bank from liability, some attorneys argue that other surrogate tests could have
been used before the introduction of commercial test kits. 'Blood Supply' Two New
Suits Filed Against San Francisco Blood Bank, AIDS POLICY AND LAW 4 (Sept. 24, 1986).
65. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1603.1 (West 1986).
66. For studies done on various AIDS tests, see Kuritsky, supra note 61; Reesink,
supra note 62.
67. Reesink, supra note 62.
68. Id. at 486. One etiologic agent of AIDS is the lymphadenopathy-associated
virus (LAV). Another virus is the human T-lymphotropic virus type-Ill. Together
these viruses are referred to as HIV. Patients with AIDS and pre-AIDS exhibit a high
prevalence of antibodies to HIV. Centers For Disease Control, Antibodies to a Re-
trovirus Etiologically Associated with Acquired Immunodeficiencv Syndrome (AIDS) in Popula-
tions with Increased Incidences of the Syndrome, 33 MMWR 377 (1984). The AIDS test
detects the presence of these antibodies but does not test for presence of the virus
itself. Kuritsky, supra note 61, at 205.
69. Reesink, supra note 62, at 486.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See generally Willett, supra note 10, at 57-61.
73. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
1988]
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standard beyond the professional standard. 74 The plaintiff in Helling
sued her opthamologist for failing to test her for glaucoma. 75 The
doctor's defense was that no one in the professional community
tested patients in the plaintiff's age group for glaucoma. 76 The
court found the defendant negligent because, as a matter of law, a
reasonable person would have administered the simple glaucoma
test.7 7 Consequently, conduct within the bounds of the accepted
professional practice may not satisfy the standard of a reasonable
person.
Considering the accessibility of data regarding HTLV-III testing, a
blood bank should be selective in choosing which test it uses. Even if
there are six approved testing devices on the market, 78 a blood bank
should take reasonable care in determining which test is most accu-
rate. This information is readily available from the manufacturer as
well as from professional research studies.79 If a test exists which
can accurately detect AIDS in 100% of the research samples, it
should be used even if other less accurate tests are approved.80 A
blood bank may be found liable for negligence even if it complies
with all medically acceptable standards. The negligent act would be
failure to use reasonable prudence in selecting a test.
Liability may also arise from inappropriate use of a screening test.
Several of the AIDS testing devices are appropriate for the screening
of routine donors. These tests may not be appropriate, however, for
use in screening donors who are members of a high risk AIDS
group.8 ' A person may be infected with AIDS but may not produce
the antibody to the virus at the time of testing.82 If the antibody is
not present, the test will report negative even though the person is
infected.83 Because of the test's limitations, it cannot be used as a
substitute for donor screening through obtaining the donor's medi-
74. Id.
75. Id. at 516, 519 P.2d at 982.
76. Id. (the plaintiff was under the age of 40).
77. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
78. It should be noted that tests with high sensitivity have a low specificity in that
the number of false positives are increased. Reesink, supra note 62. This may be a
legitimate reason for using a less sensitive test. Even though there is lack of evidence
that donors who screen positive to the test are capable of transmitting AIDS, blood
banks discard the blood. Cable, Kakaiya, Roberts, Martin, Shafer, Thaxton, Follow-up
Testing of Blood Donors Found to be Enzyme Immunoossay Positive/Western Blot Negative for
HTLV-III Antibody, 256 J. AMER. MED. ASS'N 40 (1986). This can be viewed as an
unnecessary waste of transfusable blood.
79. See generally Reesink, supra note 62.
80. Id.
81. SLAFF & BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 40.
82. Id. at 49-50.
83. Id. at 57.
[Vol. 14
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Donor self-exclusion is essential.85 Excluding high risk donors is
still the most effective way of decreasing transfusion transmission of
AIDS.86 Transfusing blood from a person who tests negative, but
who is identified as a high risk donor, is unreasonable. To avoid
negligence for inadequate testing, a blood bank must reasonably
meet all screening requirements.87 Liability may result if the individ-
ual test was inaccurate or unreasonably selected, and also, if the
scope of the screening was incomplete.88 The screening test and the
individual medical history evaluation must be used together in order
to avoid liability for negligent donor selection.
A blood bank can protect itself from liability for negligently testing
donors by following the guidelines set out by the AABB.89 Careful
test selection, accurate and complete performance of the test se-
quence, and thorough documentation of all test results will prevent
liability for negligence. Realizing that current AIDS testing is limited
and that new advances continue to be made in the testing of AIDS, a
blood bank must keep abreast of the new findings and procedures. A
blood bank cannot avoid liability by simple adherence to its current
methods of screening. In order to prevent liability for negligent test-
ing, a blood bank must be prepared to adapt its procedures as medi-
cal breakthroughs are made.
3. Directed and Autologous Donations
Direct donation is a procedure whereby a potential transfusion re-
cipient selects donors for the transfusion.90 Autologous donations
are directed donations made by the individual recipient in anticipa-
tion of a blood-related need.91 Fear of transfusion-associated AIDS
and a belief that patient-selected donors are safer prompts anxious
recipients to request one of these options.92 In response to the in-
creased public demand for directed and autologous donations, the
American Red Cross, the AABB, and the Council of Community
Blood Centers issued ajoint statement refuting the need for directed
donation programs. 93 The report recommends that: " 'directed do-
84. Id. at 40.
85. Miller, O'Connell, Leipold, Wenzel, Potential Liability for Transfusion-Associated
AIDS, 253 J. AMER. MED. Ass'N 3419, 3420 (1985) [hereinafter Miller].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 3420-21.
89. See generally AABB TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra note 9.
90. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
92. Id.
93. The current epidemic of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) and attendant publicity has led to concerns that AIDS may be trans-
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nation' programs not be conducted," because, "[a]dopting a policy
of patient-directed donations would create an illusion of additional
protection where none exists and, by disrupting existing volunteer
donor systems, could result in inability to supply blood to patients
who need it." 94
Some commentators opine that denying a recipient a directed do-
nation is grounds for negligence.95 One commentator feels that by
denying a directed donation, a blood bank is denying a recipient a
safer method of selecting donors.96 It is contended that this denial
constitutes negligence.97 The theory is that the danger inherent in
the transfusion might have been avoided by allowing the recipient to
choose donors.98 In other words, directed donations are a reason-
able alternative to mitigate the risk of transmitting AIDS through
transfusion.99 The argument favoring directed donations makes two
presumptions. First, the patient-selected donors are safer, and sec-
ond, directed donations are reasonable alternative donor selections.
Neither presumption is correct.
Scientific evidence does not justify initiation of directed donation
programs.m00 By eliminating high risk donors from the donor
pooltlo and by testing donors for HTLV-III,102 the incidence of
transfusion-associated AIDS is extremely low.1 03 The incidence is so
mitted by blood transfusion.... One consequence of the understandable,
but excessive, concern for transfusion associated AIDS has been requests by
patients and their physicians to have blood donors selected from family
members, friends, co-workers, and even newly formed private donor clubs.
... [W]e strongly recommend that 'directed donation' programs not be con-
ducted ... Adopting a policy of patient-directed donations would create an
illusion of additional protection where none exists and by disrupting ex-
isting volunteer donor systems, could result in inability to supply blood to
patients who need it.
News Release from Alfred J. Katz, M.D., Executive Director, Blood Services, Ameri-
can Red Cross National Headquarters, Washington, D.C. (June 22, 1983) (quoted in
Note, Denial of Directed Blood Donations: Grounds for Negligence in Transfusion Transmitted
Disease Cases, 12 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 11, 11 (1984).
94. Id.
95. See Miller, supra note 85; Note, Denial of Directed Blood Donations: Grounds for
Negligence in Transfusion Transmitted Disease Cases, 12 SAN. FERN. V.L. REV. 11, 18
(1984).
96. Note, supra note 95, at 12.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 20.
100. See Bove, supra note 29, at 70; Westphal, Potential Liability for Transfusion-Associ-
atedAIDS, 255J. AMER. MED. Ass'N 195 (1986) (virtually entire blood banking com-
munity on record as opposed to directed donations).
101. See supra notes 35-38, 85-86 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 54-84 and accompanying text.
103. Bove, Transfusion-Associated AIDS-A Cause for Concern, 310 N. ENG. J. MED.
115, 116 (1984). Although not all experts are convinced of the relation between
AIDS and blood transfusions, there is substantial evidence that supports the conclu-
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low that appropriate scientific studies determining the efficacy of di-
rected donation programs cannot change the results. A program of
directed donations will not decrease the risk of AIDS transmission
below the frequency of transmission in adequately screened
donors. 104
There is no evidence that directed donations are safer.105 In fact,
directed donations may increase the risk of transfusion-associated
AIDS.106 One of the most important mechanisms used to secure the
transfusion's safety is the reliability of the donor history.107 Friends
and relatives, if asked to donate, may be less honest in admitting past
medical problems or that they are members of a high risk group. It
is possible that recipients may be deceiving themselves by believing
that none of their friends or relatives are homosexuals or drug
users.' 0 8 The safest blood does not necessarily come from directed
donations. It is more reasonable to expect the safest blood to come
from anonymous volunteers, whose primary motive in making a do-
nation is to help others.109
A unique problem which occurs in promoting autologous dona-
tions is the efficient and safe storage of blood. Blood products must
be timely stored so as to preclude spoilage or contamination.1 l0 Co-
ordinating the collection of blood from a self donor in anticipation of
a scheduled voluntary medical procedure is routine. Storing donor
blood for an indeterminate period of time, however, is unworkable.
Also, it is difficult to predict with absolute accuracy the quantity of
blood a self donor will require. Promoting autologous donations
may decrease liability for transfusion-transmitted disease, but it also
establishes a new set of safety concerns.
Even if directed donations are safer, the administrative costs and
confusion would be too high to justify directed donation pro-
grams."' "[O]ne of the major causes of transfusion-related fatalities
sion that AIDS can be transmitted through blood transfusions. As ofJanuary, 1985,
92 cases of post-transfusion AIDS were being investigated by the Centers for Disease
Control. Miller, supra note 85 at 3419. See also Note, Hospital and Blood Bank Liability to
Patients Who Contract AIDS Through Blood Transfusions, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 875, 878
nn. 15-16 (1986); Ammann, Acquired Immunodeficiency in an Infant: Possible Transmission
by Aeans of Blood Products, 1 LANCET 956 (1983); Centers For Disease Control, Possible
Transfusion-Associated Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) -Califonia, 31 MMWR
652 (1982).
104. Bove, supra note 29, at 70.
105. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
106. See Bove, supra note 29, at 71; Westphal, supra note 100, at 195.
107. See Bove, supra note 29, at 71.
108. Id.
109. Westphal, supra note 100, at 195.
110. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 606, 607, 640 (1987).
111. See Bove, supra note 29, at 72, 74 (expressing concerns regarding administra-
tive confusion and costs resulting from widespread programs of directed donation);
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is administrative error-getting the wrong blood into the wrong per-
son."' 12 Experts feel that adding directed donations to an already
tough system would lead to dangerous, and perhaps, insurmounta-
ble problems.'3 Directed donations are not a reasonable means of
decreasing the frequency of transfusion associated AIDS.
Policy considerations also indicate that a practice of directed dona-
tion is unjustified. Encouraging people to save blood for themselves,
friends or relatives could lead to a critical shortage of blood for those
who need it on an emergency basis or those who do not have family
or friends.] 14 Additionally, there is no guarantee that friends and
relatives will avail themselves as volunteer donors.' 15 The blood
bank system revolves around an intricate system of volunteer dona-
tions.116 The decrease in volunteer donations would disrupt the
quality and quantity of the nation's blood supply. 17
Another policy undermining the efficacy of directed donations is
segregation of the nation's blood supply.' s Directed donations
would ultimately result in two types of blood in the blood bank-
standard blood and "better blood."119 The so-called better blood is
the blood earmarked for a specific donor. The people who would
take advantage of a system of directed donations are the informed
and the educated, and those people fortunate enough to have family
and friends with the appropriate blood type. 120 Establishing two dis-
tinct categories of available blood would result in segregation.
Blood would not necessarily be available for public use. This could
mean that persons without the benefit of family or friends or those
people who do not understand the system of directed donations
would not be able to access "better blood." This would affect the
poor, ignorant and socially inexperienced. It would make the availa-
bility of blood dependent on the social standing of the individual.
The blood available for public use would be severely limited. This
Westphal, supra note 100, at 195 (discussing logistical problems of directed dona-
tions which would make the possibility of patients receiving the wrong blood much
more likely).
112. Bove, supra note 29, at 72.
113. See id. at 71-75; Westphal, supra note 100, at 195.
114. Bove, supra note 29, at 73; Westphal, supra note 100, at 195.
115. Dr. Bove expressed concern "that the pressures applied by requests for di-
rected donation may cause some donors to be less honest and candid during the
donor interview than they should be and in that way increase, rather than reduce, the
risk of transfusion-associated AIDS." Bove, supra note 29, at 72.
116. Schmidt, supra note 22, at 12 (blood organizations are almost exclusively
non-profit enterprises with only volunteer donors, with probably less than five per-
cent of the blood supplied by proprietary blood banks).
117. See Bove, supra note 29, at 73-74; Westphal, supra note 100, at 195.
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limitation would result in battles over blood ownership and a new set
of legal concerns for the blood bank and medical professionals.121
The obvious problem arising from segregating blood supplies is,
who has the authority to decide which supply may be used? The ex-
press purpose of directing a blood donation indicates that only the
identified recipient has the right to the blood. But what happens if
someone other than the recipient needs the blood? If a seriously
injured patient needs a lifesaving transfusion, and sufficient blood
was unavailable, could a blood bank use directly donated blood to
save this person's life? Do they own the directed blood? Could peo-
ple stockpile blood and foreclose its use by others at the expense of
human life? If directed donations are encouraged, blood banks may
limit liability for negligent donor selection, yet a whole new system
of liability may evolve. Blood banks may be accused of conversion or
theft if they use directed blood.122 If they do not use directed blood,
and someone dies, the blood bank may be found liable for the
121. Schmidt, supra note 22, at 13.
122. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.52 (1986). Under an interpretation of the Minne-
sota statute on theft, blood might be analogized to a corpse, a speciman or a microor-
ganism. Additionally, if a blood bank segregates, the blood bank may be considered
a bailor or co-owner. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Subdivision 1. Definitions. In this section:
(1) "Property" means all forms of tangible property, whether real or
personal, without limitation including documents of value, electricity,
gas, water, corpses, domestic animals, dogs, pets, fowl, and heat sup-
plied by pipe or conduit by municipalities or public utility companies
and articles, as defined in clause (4)..
[Blood is analagous to a corpse].
(4) "Article" means any object, material, device or substance, includ-
ing any writing, record, recording, drawing, sample specimen, proto-
type, model, photograph, microorganism, blueprint or map, or any
copy of any of the foregoing.
[Blood as a specimen and similar to a microorganism].
(8) "Property of another" includes property in which the actor is
coowner or has a lien, pledge, bailment, or lease or other subordinate
interest, and property of a partnership of which the actor is a member,
unless the actor and the victim are husband and wife. It does not in-
clude property in which the actor asserts in good faith a claim as a col-
lection fee or commission out of property or funds recovered, or by
virtue of a lien, set-off, or counterclaim.
[Blood bank could be considered a bailor or coowner].
Subd. 2. Acts constituting theft. Whoever does any of the following com-
mits theft and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 3:
(1) intentionally and without claim of right takes, uses, transfers, con-
ceals or retains possession of movable property of another without the
other's consent and with intent to deprive the owner permanently of
possession of the property; or
(2) having a legal interest in movable property, intentionally and with-
out consent, takes the property out of the possession of a pledgee or
other person having a superior right of possession, with intent thereby
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death. 123
Public fear has stimulated requests for directed donations.124 The
way to alleviate the panic and fear is through education, and not
through widespread encouragement of directed donations.125 The
public should be informed about the safety measures taken in select-
ing donors and screening blood supplies, as well as the availability of
good blood. The American blood bank system is a good and effi-
cient system. 126 The quantity and quality of blood within that system
cannot be jeopardized by perpetuating the panic through the en-
couragement of directing blood supplies. A blood bank should not
be subject to liability for protecting the public blood supply by refus-
ing to promote directed donations.
C. Hospital Liability for Negligence
A hospital's liability for transfusion-transmitted AIDS stems from
three basic sources. Negligence may result because of an unreasona-
ble selection of the blood source, malfeasance or negligent acts of
hospital personnel, or failure to obtain informed consent prior to
transfusion. 127
1. Blood Source Selection
Hospitals should investigate the donor testing and screening pro-
cedures of their blood sources. 128 When a hospital knows or should
know that its blood bank is not following approved procedures, con-
to deprive the pledgee or other person permanently of the possession
of the property...
Id.
123. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (1986). Minnesota's Wrongful Death Act pro-
vides in part:
573.02. Action for death by wrongful act.
Subdivision 1. When death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any
person or corporation, the trustee appointed as provided in subdivision 3
may maintain an action therefor if the decedent might have maintained an
action, had the decedent lived, for an injury caused by the wrongful act or
omission. An action to recover damages for a death caused by the alleged
professional negligence of a physician, surgeon, dentist, hospital or sanato-
rium, or an employee of a physician, surgeon, dentist, hospital or sanato-
rium shall be commenced within the time set forth in section 541.07,
subdivision 1. An action to recover damages for a death caused by an inten-
tional act constituting murder may be commenced at any time after the
death of the decedent.
Id.
124. See Bove, supra note 29, at 69.
125. See id. at 75.
126. See id.
127. Willett, supra note 10, at 62-63.
128. See Miller, supra note 85, at 3421-22. Cf Hault & Atler, Blood Transfusions-
Strict Liability? 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 557, 575 (1969) (hospital's purchase of blood
from blood bank which it knew, or should have known, was operating below mini-
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tinued patronage of the blood bank constitutes negligence.129 A
hospital must undertake independent evaluation of the blood bank's
procedures. Reliance on reputation alone may be dangerous. In or-
der to avoid liability, a hospital must keep informed of acceptable
screening procedures and monitor the procedures of the blood
banks and services it uses.
2. Supervision of Medical Staff
A hospital is responsible for supervising its transfusion practices.
This duty may be satisfied through a hospital's transfusion practices
committee.' 30 Establishment of this committee is mandated by the
JCAH.131 This committee provides supervision of the blood services
in the hospital and provides recommendations as necessary.132
A hospital has a duty to hire competent staff, supervise its existing
staff and monitor the quality of patient care.' 33 A hospital may dele-
gate these duties to supervisory staff or special committees, but it
may not delegate its responsibility.t34 Under the theory of respon-
deat superior, a hospital is responsible for the actions of its employ-
ees, whether they be doctors, supervisors or non-care giving staff. If
a physician orders an unnecessary transfusion and a disease is trans-
mitted, the hospital as well as the physician may be liable.135 The
extent of the hospital's liability will depend on the amount of super-
vision provided, the reasonable expectations of the hospital as to the
physician's practices, and whether or not the hospital evaluated the
physician's transfusion practices.136 The hospital may be relieved of
liability if the error was a mistake in medical judgment and not a
breach of procedure. If the physician has a history of transfusion
errors, however, the hospital may be held liable for failing to provide
adequate supervision.' 37
mum standards of care would have constituted a breach of the hospital's duty to use
due care).
129. See Hault & Atler, supra note 128, at 575.
130. See generally Willett, supra note 10, at 62.
131. JCAH ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 86-87 (1985).
132. See Franklin, supra note 11, at 454; Dornett, Negligence and Liability Issues,
LEGAL ISSUES IN TRANSFUSION MEDICINE 129 (AABB ed. 1986).
133. See, e.g., Blanton v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 319 N.C. 372, 375, 354
S.E.2d 455, 458 (1987). Cf Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985)
(holding that hospital may be vicariously liable for its physician's negligence).
134. Willett, supra note 10, at 62-63.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Comment, Patients Rights and Informed Consent: An Emergency, Case for
Hospitals?, 12 CAL. W.L. REV. 406, 416 (1970) (hospital not liable for negligent acts of
doctor unless independent breach).
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3. Informed Consent
AIDS is a risk involved in transfusion.138 As such, patients should
be informed of this potential risk prior to consenting to a transfu-
sion.139 The general common law rule is that the physician, not the
hospital, has the duty to inform patients of risks involved in a pro-
posed procedure. 140 Informed consent may or may not be the hospi-
tal's responsibility. 141
The Patient's Bill of Rights, which was drafted by the American
Hospital Association, contains language suggesting that a hospital
has an independent responsibility to secure informed consent.142 At
least one commentator views the Patient's Bill of Rights as a hospi-
tal's self-imposed standard of care. 143 A hospital's failure to inform
a patient of the risk of AIDS in a transfusion procedure could be a
breach of the hospital's self-imposed standard of care to obtain in-
formed consent. Other professionals seriously doubt this theory of
negligence.144 The fundamental treatment decisions and duty to ob-
138. See Parmet, supra note 2, at 72.
139. See, e.g., Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1986) (physician
has a duty to inform patient of the risks of medical procedures).
140. See, e.g., Scaria v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 227
N.W.2d 647, 656 (1975).
141. See Willett, supra note 10, at 63.
142. Although individual hospitals may publish their own bill of rights, the Ameri-
can Hospital Association's bill of rights is representative:
The American Hospital Association presents a Patient's Bill of Rights with
the expectation that observance of these rights will contribute to more effec-
tive patient care and greater satisfaction for the patient, his physician, and
the hospital organization. Further, the Association presents these rights in
the expectation that they will be supported by the hospital on behalf of its
patients, as an integral part of the healing process. It is recognized that a
personal relationship between the physician and the patient is essential for
the provision of proper medical care. The traditional physician-patient rela-
tionship takes on a new dimension when care is rendered within an organi-
zational structure. Legal precedent has been established that the institution
itself also has a responsibility to the patient. It is in recognition of these
factors that these rights are affirmed....
3) The patient has the right to receive from his physician information nec-
essary to give informed consent prior to the start of any procedure and/or
treatment. Except in emergencies, such information for informed consent,
should include but not necessarily be limited to the specific procedure
and/or treatment, the medically significant risks involved, and the probable
duration of incapacitation. Where medically significant alternatives for care
or treatment exist, or when the patient requests information concerning
medical alternatives, the patient has the right to such information. The pa-
tient also has the right to know the name of the person responsible for the
procedures and/or treatment. ...
AMERICAN HOSPITAL AsSOCIATION, A PATIENT'S BILL OF RIGHTS (1972) cited in Com-
ment, Patient s Rights and Informed Consent: An Emergency Case for Hospitals?, 12 CAL. IW.
L. REv. 406, 407 n.7 (1976).
143. See Comment, supra note 137, at 420-24.
144. Willett, supra note 10, at 63.
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tain informed consent remain with the physician in spite of the Pa-
tient's Bill of Rights. A hospital that fails to notify a patient of risks
inherent in a treatment is only liable to the extent that it was on




There are three ways in which a doctor is subject to negligence
claims. First, he may be liable for negligently transfusing the patient.
Second, he may be liable for negligent supervision of the transfu-
sion. Third, he may be liable for not obtaining informed consent
from the patient prior to giving the transfusion.
The first claim for negligence may be based on a materiality stan-
dard. 146 The duty of care under the materiality standard is a reason-
able professional standard.14 7 A doctor is more likely to be liable for
negligently prescribing the transfusion rather than for negligently
admininistering the transfusion. 148 A doctor is rarely found person-
ally negligent for transfusion technique since the actual procedure is
most often delegated to nursing or blood service staff. A doctor may
be found liable, however, for the acts of his subordinates under the
theory of respondeat superior.14 9
The theory of respondeat superior applies to the doctor in the
same way it applies to the hospital.150 He is responsible for supervis-
ing the treatment and care, whether or not he delegates the physical
procedure to other employees. He has the professional duty to see
that the patient's expectations of medical care are met, and like the
hospital, he cannot delegate that duty.151
Assuming that the doctor is not guilty of negligent procedure or
negligent supervision, the key to avoiding liability in most situations
is to obtain informed consent before the transfusion is given. In-
formed consent refers to a patient's right to participate in the treat-
145. Id.
146. Miller, supra note 85, at 3422 (author discusses the impact of Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), where the court held that a
physician must disclose all information that a reasonably prudent physician would
consider "material" to a patient's decision concerning therapy).
147. Id.
148. See generally Annotation, Liability of Operating Surgeon for Negligence of Nurse As-
sisting Him, 12 A.L.R.3D 1017, 1031 (1967) (doctor not liable for negligent adminis-
tration of transfusion where specific instructions were left with nurse).
149. Id. at 1019-20.
150. Id. at 1019-24.
151. See generally Annotation, Duty of Physician or Surgeon to Warn or Instruct Nurse or
Attendant, 63 A.L.R.3D 1020, 1024-25 (1975).
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ment decision.152 A doctor may be at substantial risk of liability if a
patient develops post-transfusion AIDS and the doctor did not ob-
tain informed consent. 153 This requires that the patient be fully ap-
prised of all risks involved with the procedure and the product,
which is blood.t54 The doctor also has the duty to inform the patient
of all alternative procedures.155 If a doctor does not meet his duty,
he is liable for undisclosed problems which could reasonably be de-
termined to result from the transfusion.
Two basic standards exist for determining whether informed con-
sent is necessary under the particular circumstances.156 The stan-
dard adopted in early cases, and the one that is still the law in a
majority of jurisdictions, is the professional practice standard. 157
The alternative is the materiality standard.t58
The professional practice standard requires a physician to make
the disclosures that a reasonable medical practitioner would
make.159 A doctor must balance the incidence of the risk against the
degree of harm caused by the risk when evaluating the need for in-
formed consent.160 If the risk is one that other physicians in the
community ordinarily inform patients of, a failure to inform a patient
of that risk is a negligent omission.t61
The materiality standard requires a doctor to disclose information
that a reasonable person in the patient's situation would consider
material in deciding whether to undergo the treatment. 62 The prac-
tice of other physicians is irrelevant.63 The focus under this stan-
152. Hirsch, Informed Consent Jor Treatment or Operation, HANDBOOK OF LEGAL
MEDICINE 212-216 (5th ed. 1979).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Kohoutek v. Hasner, 383 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. 1986). See also text accom-
panying supra note 139.




159. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 420 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845
(1974); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 409, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960); Woolley
v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1129 (Me. 1980); Manion v. Tweedy, 257 Minn. 59, &
66 100 N.W.2d 124, 129 (1959); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 651, 222 S.E.2d 783,
786-87 (1976) (whether informed consent is required is determined by expert medi-
cal opinion).
160. Willett, supra note 10, at 64.
161. POZGAR, supra note 156, at 98.
162. See Kinikin v. Heupel, 305 N.W.2d 589 (Minn. 1981). See also Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (another
factor to be considered is whether a reasonable patient would have refused the pro-
cedure had the risk been disclosed); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr.
505, 502 P.2d I (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
163. See POZGAR, supra note 156, at 99-100.
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dard is what a reasonable patient would demand to know. 164
The choice of standard could affect the outcome in a suit for a
transfusion-transmitted disease. Hepatitis is a risk of transfusion for
which most doctors do not obtain informed consent. 165 Most feel
that the risk is sufficiently remote to preclude liability under a theory
of informed consent. 166 The transfusion-associated risk of AIDS is
even more remote.167 Thus, under a professional practice standard,
it appears that a physician would not be negligent for failing to in-
form a patient of the risk of AIDS.
A different result may be reached under the materiality theory.
The degree of harm resulting from AIDS may be material to a pa-
tient's decision to accept a transfusion. The materiality of the AIDS
risk, however, must be balanced against the reason for the transfu-
sion. In many cases a transfusion is necessary to save a patient's life.
If this is the case, the materiality of the risk is mitigated by the crucial
need for the transfusion. A jury would have to determine the bal-
ance between the risk of AIDS and the need for the transfusion when
deciding if informed consent was reasonable.
At least one commentator feels that a physician does not have a
legal obligation to inform a patient of the very remote risk of
AIDS.168 Instead, he feels the physician has an ethical obligation to
discuss AIDS with a patient receiving a transfusion.16 9 Fear of con-
tracting AIDS has made patients anxious and reluctant to receive
necessary transfusions. By discussing the remoteness of the risk, the
physician has not only calmed a frightened patient, but has also met
the requirement of informed consent.170
E. Donor Liability
A plaintiff who is suing for a transfusion-transmitted disease would
find it difficult to place liability on the donor. First, the plaintiff
164. Id.
165. Willett, supra note 10, at 64.
166. Id.
167. The blood testing procedure will practically eliminate any cases of transfu-
sion-transmitted AIDS. However, new cases of AIDS will continue to appear in the
coming years because of the long incubation period of the AIDS virus and because
the testing procedure was only implemented in May 1985. SLAFF & BRUBAKER, supra
note 7, at 50. Prior to September 1, 1986, only 177 (2%) of all AIDS cases reported
to the Centers for Disease Control had been transfusion-associated. Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) IWeekly Surveillance Report-United States AIDS Program,
Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control (Sept. 1, 1986) cited in
Comment, Hospital and Blood Bank Liability to Patients Who Contract AIDS Through Blood
Transfusions, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 875, 876 n. 3 (1986).
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would have to identify the donor of the contaminated blood.171 This
is sometimes impossible.172 In South Florida Blood Service, Inc. v. Ras-
mussen, 173 a plaintiff attempted to compel discovery of a donor's
identity. 174 The court denied the plaintiff's request, holding that the
privacy interest of the donor was greater than the victim's interest in
learning the donor's identity.] 75 It would be a significant burden for
a plaintiff to show that his right to discover evidence relevant to his
suit outweighed the donor's right to privacy.
If a plaintiff is able to identify the donor, then the patient must
show that the donor knew, or should have known, that he was in-
flicted with a disease at the time he gave blood and that the disease
could endanger a recipient. 176 Without proof of knowledge, a blood
donor is not liable to a donee.177 Even if a donor is negligent, the
likelihood of recovering a judgment is small, since the usual donor
does not have the financial resources to pay excessive damages.
II. STRICT LIABILITY
Negligence focuses on whether the defendant knew, or should
have known, at the time the conduct took place, of the foreseeability
of danger.178 Strict liability relates to the defectiveness of the prod-
uct and gives the plaintiff the capacity to impose blame on a non-
negligent defendant.179 The definition of strict liability, in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, section 402A, clearly explains that it is
the defectiveness of the product and not any intentional or negligent
conduct that establishes a chain of liability.180
171. Williams, supra note 17, at 271.
172. See infra notes 173-75.
173. 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd 500 So. 2d 533 (1987).
174. Id. at 800.
175. Id. at 804 (another factor weighed by the court was prospective donors' fear
that their identities would be revealed).
176. Hubbell v. South Nassau Communities Hosp., 46 Misc. 2d 847, 260 N.Y.S.2d
539 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (strict liability is not applicable to donor of contaminated
blood).
177. Id.
178. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to the Mar-
keting, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 734, 739 (1983).
179. Id.
180. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
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There are four rationales for imposing strict liability: loss spread-
ing, resource allocation, consumer expectation, and safety incen-
tive.181 The loss spreading theory recognizes the desirability to
maximize the number of persons bearing a loss in order to minimize
its impact on any one defendant.182 It rests on the defendant's abil-
ity to use insurance to spread the cost.
18 3
The resource allocation rationale is based on the premise that a
product's price should reflect the product's true marketplace cost.
8 4
Costs associated with remedying injuries caused by a product should
be included in the total price of the product, placing part of the re-
covery burden on the consumer.
The rationale imposing strict liability based on consumer expecta-
tion and safety incentives assumes that imposition of strict liability
will give manufacturers the financial incentive to market only safe
products.18 5 This incentive would satisfy the consumer's expectation
of a safe product and encourage manufacturers and suppliers to seek
out ways to keep the product safe.
Courts are split regarding the applicability of principles of strict
liability involving contaminated blood.186 Courts refusing to imply a
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
181. See Williams, supra note 17, at 278-281.
182. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d. 453, 462-63, 150 P.2d 436,
440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of
Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153 (1976).
183. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort Liabil-
ity, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 853, 885 (1983).
184. See Klemme, supra note 182, at 159-60.
185. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462-63, 150 P.2d at 443-44 (1944). See Note, Strict Liabil-
ity - The Medical Service Immunity and Blood Transfusions in California, 7 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 196, 211 (1974).
186. Some cases allow the theory of strict liability for contaminated blood. See
Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 195 Colo. 529, 579 P.2d 1158 (1978)
(en banc); Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 I11. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897
(1970); DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 836 (1982). Other cases refused to allow the theory of strict liability.
See McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 866,
133 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1976); Klaus v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n Blood
Bank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 417, 133 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1976); Fisher v. Sibley Memorial
Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130 (App. D.C. 1979); McAllister v. American Nat. Red Cross, 240
Ga. 246, 240 S.E.2d 247 (1977); Glass v. Ingalls Memorial Hosp., 32 Il1. App. 3d 237,
336 N.E.2d 495 (1975); McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1975); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn.
151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Moore v. Underwood Memorial Hosp., 147 N.J. Super.
252, 371 A.2d 105 (1977); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 66 NJ. 448, 332 A.2d 596
(1975); Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075, cert. denied, 87 N.M.
111, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974); lannucci v. Yonkers Gen. Hosp., 59 A.D.2d 887, 399
N.Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); Morse v. Riverside Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 422,
339 N.E.2d 846 (1974).
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warranty or to apply the strict liability theory have done so by ruling
that a transfusion is a service and not a sale of a product.18 7 The
leading case holding that a transfusion is a service is Perlmutter v. Beth
David Hospital.188 The New York Court of Appeals in Perlmutter
stated:
Concepts of purchase and sale cannot separately be attached to the
healing materials - such as medicines, drugs, or, indeed, blood -
supplied by the hospital for a price as part of the medical services it
offers. That the property or title to certain items of medical mate-
rial may be transferred, so to speak, from the hospital to the patient
during the course of medical treatment does not serve to make
each such transaction a sale. 18
9
Inherent in each court's decision not to apply strict liability, is a
hint of the charitable immunity doctrine. For example, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court in Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood
Bank 190 found it "difficult to give literal application of principles of
law designed to impose strict accountability in commercial transac-
tions to a voluntary and charitable activity which serves a humane
and public health purpose."1 9 1
The first case to hold a defendant strictly liable for contaminated
blood was Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital.192 The court in
Cunningham reaffirmed the abolition of the charitable immunity doc-
trine and held that blood was a product within the meaning of sec-
tion 402AI93 and that contaminated blood is in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. 194 The defendant in Cun-
ningham argued that the blood was not defective, since no test for
hepatitis existed at the time the blood was donated. 195 The court
rejected this argument concluding that the unavailability of blood
tests was immaterial.196 The court stated that "[a]ny other ruling
would be entirely inconsistent with the concept of strict tort
liability." 197
The rationales for strict liability may be economically and socially
sound in a "regular" product market. They are not sound ideas in a
"blood" market. Of utmost importance is the policy of assuring an
187. See, e.g., McDonald, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 870, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 446; Balkowitsch,
270 Minn. at 157-58, 132 N.W.2d at 810.
188. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
189. Id. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
190. 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965).
191. Id. at 159, 132 N.W.2d at 811.
192. 47 11. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
193. See supra note 180 for text of Section 402A.
194. 47 Ill. 2d at 456, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
195. Id. at 453, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
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adequate and obtainable supply of lifesaving blood. In business, if
the cost of marketing a product is too great, the product is no longer
marketed. Only where a profit can be made, will an economically
reasonable supplier market a particular product. Profit is not the
main moving factor in marketing blood.198 A supplier of blood is
not economically motivated in the same sense as a business person.
The primary drive is to save lives, not to make a profit.
Advocates favoring the imposition of strict liability on distributors
of blood products may rely on the resource allocation rationale. If
strict liability is a viable theory, the cost of injury due to contami-
nated blood could be added to the cost of each blood unit.'99 Im-
posing the financial burden of strict liability on a blood supplier, who
already has a minimal profit margin, could potentially force the sup-
plier out of business or force the price of blood to skyrocket. If this
happens, the availabilty of blood will become a critical issue. Only
those people who are fortunate enough to afford extensive medical
insurance or who have funds on-hand to purchase blood, would be
able to access the life-giving fluid. Blood would become a luxury
item, not a necessary product.
The courts, legislatures and the public, need to take a closer look
at our tort system and the applicability of strict liability to such a vital
service. Is the purpose of our tort system compensation without
fault? The loss spreading rationale of strict liability provides a com-
pensation device, not a tort principle. 200 The controlling factor for
imposing liability should not be to provide compensation.20i
When injury occurs, someone has to bear the financial burden.
That burden, viewed from a products' liability perspective, lies either
with the supplier or the injured party. The fact is that society ulti-
mately shares in that burden no matter who is blamed. If the burden
falls on the supplier, society pays with increased product cost or,
sometimes, even the loss of the product. If the victim bears the fi-
nancial burden, society pays the price of supporting the victim. In
both cases, the public shares the increased cost of insurance
premiums.
The determination of fairness does not dictate who should bear
198. The majority of this country's blood supply is obtained from volunteers.
"[T]he percentage of commercial blood, plasma, or platelets in the system is proba-
bly under one or two percent. For all practical purposes, there is no commercial
blood in the system." Bove, supra note 29, at 70.
199. See Franklin, supra note 11, at 463; Klemme, supra note 182, at 158-60.
200. Wade, supra note 178, at 755.
201. Id. at 756. This commentator acknowledges the fact that different schools of
thought exist as to the purpose of our tort system. Establishing a fair system to com-
pensate or aid those who have been injured, not through their own fault or the fault
of another, is a difficult, if not impossible, task. The tort system is but one possible
device which may be used to compensate these people.
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the cost. Fairness is subjective. Some courts and commentators fo-
cus on the innocent victim, and decide that fairness delegates the
cost to the supplier of the product.202 Others feel that the imposi-
tion of liability cannot be justified where a manufacturer could not
have been aware of the danger from a scientific standpoint. 20 3
In Minnesota, the trend is moving away from the application of
strict liability in its true sense. For example, it has been argued that
in design defect and failure to warn cases, there is essentially little
difference between strict liability and negligence.204 Contaminated
blood could be viewed as a manufacturing defect for which strict lia-
bility is still available. However, imposing strict liability would not
satisfy the safety incentive rationale. The blood bank profession is
utilizing all available technology and is developing new procedures
daily. The medical profession is expending millions of dollars to
eliminate the possibility of transfusion-transmitted diseases. The
motive is altruistic. People cannot live without blood. This is the
best safety incentive.
Legislatures in most states have already responded to the courts'
application of strict liability to transfusion-transmitted diseases. The
majority of the laws enacted declare transfused blood to be a service,
precluding suits based on strict liability.205 These statutes have with-
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 214-15 (Minn. 1982)
(Simonette, J., dissenting); see also Bilotta v. Kelly Co., Inc., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622
(Minn. 1984) "The distinction between strict liability and negligence in design-defect
and failure-to-warn cases is that in strict liability, knowledge of the condition of the
product and the risks involved in that condition will be imputed to the manufacturer,
whereas in negligence, these elements must be proven." Id.
205. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 7-2-314(4) (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.316(e) (1986);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1481(B) (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1608 (1977); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-104(2)
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-280 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-316(5)
(1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-28(a) (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.316(5) (West
1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 11-2-316(5) (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327-51 (1985); IDAHO
CODE § 39-3702 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 5102 (Smith-Hurd 1985);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-7-2 (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 142A.8 (West Supp.
1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3701 (1985); Ky. STAT. ANN. § 139.125 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2797 (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 2-108 (West Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-402 (1986);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316(5) (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. § 525.928
(1986); Mo. REV. STAT. § 431.069 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-33-102 (1985);
NEB. REX'. STAT. § 71-4001 (1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 460.010 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT
ANN. § 507:8-b (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-5 (1986); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW
§ 580(4) (McKinney Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33(3)(d) (1983); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.11 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2151 (1984); OR.
REV. STAT. § 97.300 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-315.1 (Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5)
(1979); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(e) (Vernon 1968); UTAH CODE ANN.
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stood constitutional scrutiny2O6 and it appears that the federal gov-
ernment will not intervene.
Legislatures enacting these laws appear to recognize the medical,
economic and social implications of imposing strict liability on trans-
fusion services. The courts seem to focus solely on the black letter
law. The only purpose in imposing strict liability is to compensate a
few unfortunate people who are injured because of a transfusion.
This purpose, while worthwhile in itself, does not justify the destruc-
tion of our blood system. The compensation of a few may ultimately
jeopardize the lives of many. Strict liability should never be applied
to blood transfusions.
CONCLUSION
Strict liability should not be the source of increased liability and
disproportionate, professional standards of care. AIDS should not
threaten the current stature of tort law and professional liability.
The duties that a blood bank, hospital and physician owe a recipient
have not changed. The applicable standards of care, however, must
be religiously adhered to. If not, the potential for liability is signifi-
cantly increased due to the devastating effect of AIDS.
Although the effect of AIDS is debilitating, the compensation of
the few possible victims of transfusion-transmitted AIDS, does not
outweigh the potential destruction of the American blood service
system. Suits in strict liability should be precluded. Compensation
without negligent conduct will serve only to decrease the accessibil-
ity of blood.
Blood is a unique product. It gives life. In reviewing transfusion
liability rules in the context of AIDS, courts and legislatures should
formulate rules which protect this lifegiving system. There is no sub-
stitute for blood.
Lynn Shodahl*
§ 26-31-1 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-297 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.54.120 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 16-23-1 (1985); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 146.31(2) (West Supp. 1987); WYo. STAT. § 34-21-233(c)(iv) (1987).
206. See, e.g., Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 509, 220
Cal. Rptr. 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
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